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The paper presents a theoretical model of private consumption that emcompasses 
both the conventional (Keynesian) view of  fiscal policy and the Ricardian debt 
neutrality  hypothesis. The effects  of  fiscal  policy  on  private  consumption  are 
analyzed  in  an  extended  framework built  on  Blanchard's  stochastic model  of 
intertemporal  optimization  with  finitely  lived  consumers,  in  which  private 
consumption depends on expected lifetime wealth. The model also nests various 
hypotheses  concerning  the  relationship  between  public  spending  and  private 
consumption.  Empirical  analysis  is  based  on  the  Finnish  annual  data  from 
1960- 1995 and uses  the nonlinear instrumental variable GMM estimator. The 
tests cannot reject the hypothesis that consumers are Ricardian. Moreover, the 
results suggest that in the consumers' utility functions, government consumption is 
a substitute for private consumption. 
Keywords: private consumption, private saving, fiscal policy, planning horizon 
Tiivis  telrna 
Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan julkisen talouden rahoitusvaihtoehtojen - verotuksen 
ja  velkarahoituksen - vaikutuksia yksityiseen kulutukseen ja saastamiseen. Teo- 
reettiset tarkastelut perustuvat ajan yli optimoivan kuluttajan mallille, jossa kulut- 
tajien suunnitteluhorisontti on aiirellinen ja jossa kulutus riippuu odotetusta elin- 
ikiiisesta varallisuudesta. Julkinen kulutus vaikuttaa mallissa yksityisen kulutuksen 
aikauraan sikali kuin silla on vaikutusta kotitalouksien kokemaan hyvinvointiin. 
Se, onko jullunen kulutus yksityista kulutusta kowaavaa vai taydentavaa kulutusta 
maiiraytyy viime kadessa havaintoaineiston perusteella. Suomen aineistolla tehty 
empiirinen analyysi kattaa vuodet 1960- 1995. Analyysimenetelmana on kaytetty 
epalineaarista  instrumenttimuuttujamenetelmaa  (GMM).  Tulokset  tukevat  ns. 
Ricardon  velkaneutraliteettihypoteesia, jonka  mukaan  velalla rahoitettu  verojen 
alentaminen ei lisaa yksityista kulutusta, koska kuluttajat ottavat huomioon valtion 
velanhoitomenojen  kasvusta  aiheutuvat  tulevat  veronkorotustarpeet ja  lisaavat 
saastamistaan.  Tulosten  mukaan  kuluttajat  kokevat  julkiset  menot  yksityista 
kulutusta korvaavina. 
Asiasanat: yksityinen kulutus, yksityinen saastaminen, finanssipolitiikka, suunnit- 
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Large and persistent budget deficits and increasing government indebtedness have 
been among the most important topics in economic policy discussions worldwide 
almost two decades. During the 1990s the issue has gained even stronger emphasis 
as the fiscal position of several countries in the European Union has proved to be 
the most difficult obstacle in the way towards full economic and monetary union. 
Despite the growing interest of policy makers and economists in the sustainability 
of government debt and the efficiency of fiscal policy, neither economic theory nor 
empirical evidence give any clear cut answers what the effects of fiscal policy in 
general and of budget deficits and government debt in particular on the aggregate 
demand are. In fact there exists sharp controversies on this issue. 
Most of the debate centers around the question whether government financing 
decisions influence private consumption and saving or not. In general, the answer 
to this question depends on the degree to which consumers treat government debt 
as  net  wealth.  The  two  opposite  views  on  the  subject  are  the  conventional 
(Keynesian) view  and the Ricardian equivalence or debt neutrality hypothesis.' 
The conventional view, that formed a consensus opinion until the  1970s, states 
that government deficits stimulate private consumption and aggregate demand in 
the short run, because private sector perceives government bonds as net wealth. 
Assuming that government expenditure is constant, the larger the government debt 
is, the wealthier households feel and the more they cons~me.~  However, higher 
real interest rates that result from depressed private and national saving may crowd 
out private investment and thereby reduce the long run  growth potential of  the 
economy. The long run negative effects offset thus at least partially the positive 
short  run  effects.  What  the  total  effect  of  deficit  financing  is,  remains 
unambiguous. 
By  ignoring  the  intertemporal  budget  constraint  of  the  government,  the 
conventional approach is based on an implicit assumption that consumers are too 
myopic  to  account  for  the  future  fiscal  policy  implications  of  current  debt 
accumulation, or that they are liquidity constrained. Alternatively, consumers can 
be thought to have asymmetric perceptions with regard to the future consequences 
of the current changes in government debt and taxation (Kormendi (1983)). Since 
consumers  perceive  government  debt  as  a  part  of  their  wealth,  private 
consumption increases with increases in the debt and decreases with increases in 
current taxation. 
In an environment where the concern about the sustainability of fiscal policies 
is deepening and the need for fiscal adjustment is widely recognized, it is more 
' Recently, there has emerged also a third line of  reasoning called non- or anti-Keynesian view 
stating that with high government debt/GDP ratios and large budget deficits, contractionary fiscal 
policies  may have expansionary effect on private consumption, see Bertola and Drazen (1993), 
Sutherland (1995), and for empirical evidence Giavazzi and Pagano (1990, 1995). 
This can not, however, hold indefinitely in a closed economy, since private sector has to increase 
their  saving alongside  the new  government debt, and  hence  consumption must  fall unless the 
private sector does not finance their purchases of government bonds by borrowing. In this case, the 
net wealth effect is, however, zero assuming that the interest rates are the same for the government 
and the private sector. plausible to  assume that private consumers are influenced not only by  current 
fiscal policy but also by anticipations about the future path of government budget 
variables. The most influential attempt to introduce rational behaviour and fiscal 
expectations  into  a  forward-looking permanent  income-life  cycle consumption 
model was made by Barro (1974) in his famous paper on Ricardian equivalence. 
He  showed that  intertemporally maximizing rational  consumers will  not  view 
government debt as a part of their net wealth if they accurately anticipate the future 
tax liability of  that debt. Rational consumers would realize that the public debt 
created now by government borrowing must be repaid in the future by an increase 
in  taxes.  Provided  that  the  present  value  of  government  expenditures  is  not 
affected by the choice of budget deficits and surpluses, ie by the timing of taxes, 
private consumption remains unchanged. Instead consumers will increase saving 
in order to avoid sharp decline in their future disposable income and consumption 
due to higher taxes. Ricardian equivalence holds when the increase in the private 
sector savings will exactly offset the rising government deficit. 
The key prediction of the Ricardian equivalence is thus that for a given path 
of  government  expenditures,  the  precise  mix  by  which  they  are  financed  is 
irrelevant from the point of  view of economic activity. Deficit financing merely 
generates the private saving necessary to absorb the additional government debt, 
leaving national saving and interest rates, investment and output unaltered. 
Barro demonstrated that Ricardian equivalence holds if consumers and the 
government  have  the  same  effective  time  or  planning  h~rizon,~  taxes  are 
nondistortionary, capital markets are perfect with no borrowing constraints and 
there  is full certainty about the path  of  incomes, future taxes  and government 
expenditure. Thus, Ricardian equivalence requires several restrictive assumptions 
about the economic environment and the behaviour of  consumers. By relaxing 
these assumptions (or some of them) not only does Ricardian equivalence breake 
down but  non-conventional and, especially, non-Keynesian results  also start to 
emerge.4 Moreover,  deviations  from  debt  neutrality  occur  if  the  changes  in 
The  models  on  Ricardian  equivalence generally assume  that  the  consumers  as  well  as  the 
government have an infinite planning horizon. This is not,  however,  a necessary condition for 
Ricardian equivalence to hold. The sufficient condition is that consumers have the same planning 
horizon  as the government, ie the period that  takes to levy the taxes associated with the debt 
service. If consumers' planning horizon is shorter than that of the government (eg finite horizon) so 
that part of the debt is shifted to the future generations or if consumers do not fully perceive the 
future tax implications of the current debt issue (eg consumers are to some extent myopic), the 
anticipation of future debt service obligations only partially offsets the value of the debt and there 
will be a net wealth effect leading to an increase in private consumption and interest rates (different 
discount rates, see Feldstein 1982). Barro (1974), however, asserted that the planning horizon in 
this context is irrelevant; individuals will  act as if  they lived forever because they are linked to 
future generations through a chain of  altruistic bequests. Intergenerational altruism leads to debt 
neutrality.  When  the  assumption  of  operative bequests is  dropped, it  is  clear  that  a  tax  cut 
represents  an  increase in  lifetime wealth,  which  therefore could be  expected  to  cause a small 
increase in consumption in the current and future years. A tax cut that is known to be permanent 
would  of  course imply a much larger increase in  lifetime wealth and would therefore include a 
much larger immediate increase in consumption (see Feldstein 1982; Haque 1988). For a detailed 
discussion  about the assumptions required for the Ricardian equivalence to hold, see Bernheim 
(1987), Leiderman and Blejer (1988), Seater (1993). 
4  For detailed discussions of the literature, see Barro (1989a), Bernheim (1987), Leiderman and 
Blejer (1988) and Seater (1993). taxation  are  accompanied  by  shifts  in  government  spending  and/or  transfer 
payments, monetization of government debt, or in both. All in all, the conventional 
Keynesian predictions can  be  obtained  also in  the intertemporal maximization 
framework with rational expectations. 
The Ricardian and conventional views of government debt have very different 
policy implications. According to the conventional view the deficit financing can 
have a considerable impact on private consumption and aggregate demand. If  the 
Ricardian  equivalence proposition  holds,  a  switch from tax  financing  to  debt 
financing has no  stimulating effect on the economy even in the  short run  and 
hence,  the  attempts  to  stabilize  economy  are  doomed  to  be  futile.  Private 
consumption responds only to the level and flow of government expenditure and 
not to the debtltax mix by which it is financed. If  this is a valid prediction, the 
scope for macroeconomic stabilization by fiscal policy can be summarized by the 
path of government expenditures and by the substitutability between private and 
government consumption. 
The  extent  to  which  consumers  foresee  future  taxes  or  any  other  fiscal 
measures  associated  with  current  issues  of  government  debt  is,  however,  an 
empirical question and cannot be resolved by theoretical argumentation alone. The 
relevant question for empirical studies is then which of  the views, Ricardian or 
conventional provides a better framework for analyzing overall effects of  fiscal 
policy on private consumption. 
1.1  Purpose of the paper 
The purpose of  this paper is to derive an intertemporal model of  consumption 
behaviour that is general enough to be able to encompass the main two hypotheses 
suggested by the literature; the Ricardian equivalence proposition stating that for a 
given path of government expenditure the substitution of debt for taxes to finance 
the budget deficit does not affect private consumption and the alternative view in 
which budget deficits and current taxes are not equivalent. The model draws on 
the works of Hall (1978), Aschauer (1985) and Blanchard (1985). 
Since the seminal contribution of Hall (1978), numerous studies have applied 
an intertemporal optimizing framework to examine consumption behaviour. Most 
of this research has focused on testing the permanent income hypothesis and not 
on  the  relationship  between  private  consumption  and  government  budget 
variables. The few exceptions that incorporate the government budget constraint 
explicitly  in  the  consumer's  optimization  problem  and  account  for  the 
substitutability of government and private consumption include Aschauer (1985), 
Modigliani and Sterling (1986), Haug (1990), and Graham and Himarios (1991). 
Since these models are derived in the infinite horizon framework, the nesting of 
Ricardian equivalence and an alternative hypothesis of  non-Ricardian behaviour 
rests on somewhat ad hoc formulations. 
The standard intertemporal framework can, however, be modified to allow for 
finite  horizons  and  hence,  non-Ricardian  effects  of  fiscal  policy  in  line  with 
Blanchard's  (1985) seminal  paper.  A  finite  planning horizon  of  consumers  in 
Blanchard's  model introduces a wedge between the real rate of return on assets 
and the rate at which consumers discount their uncertain future labour income, thus causing Ricardian equivalence to fail. Ricardian equivalence emerges then 
only  as  a  special  case  when  the  discount  rates  on  assets and  labour  income 
coincide. Blanchard did not consider the effects of public consumption - the focus 
is solely in the effects of  a reallocation of taxes when consumers have finite time 
horizons. 
Since the  focus  here  is  not  to derive  a testable  model  for the  Ricardian 
equivalence per  se, but  a more  general framework for analysing the effects of 
fiscal policy on private consumption, the model also nests various hypotheses 
concerning  the  relationship between  public  spending and private consumption 
following Aschauer (1985). Both the substitutability and complementarity of the 
public  and private consumption are allowed for. One can  also test Feldstein's 
(1982)  full  fiscal  neutrality  hypothesis  whereby  an  increase  in  government 
consumption induces  an  ex  ante crowding  out  of  an  equal  amount of  private 
consumption as well as Kormendi's (1983) proposition of asymmetric effects of 
taxes and government transfer payments. The model can be further extended to 
incorporate liquidity constraints arising from imperfect capital markets. If  part of 
the consumers are not able to smooth out the fluctuations in current income by 
borrowing against the future income stream, changes in taxation and government 
debt will affect consumers' net wealth and consumption. 
The rest  of  the paper is organized as  follows. An  intertemporal model  of 
consumption  behaviour is  derived  in  section  2. The questions  concerning  the 
empirical implementation and method of estimation are discussed in section 3. 
Section 4 presents the data and estimation results. Concluding remarks are drawn 
in section 5. 
2  An intertemporal model of consumption 
behaviour 
The effect of fiscal policy on private consumption is analyzed in the framework of 
a  stochastic  intertemporal  optimization  problem  where  rational  consumers 
maximize the expected value of  utility, subject to the lifetime budget constraint. 
Individual  consumers  are  assumed  to  face  exogenous  stochastic  processes  of 
disposable labour income and government consumption. The approach is similar 
to that of Aschauer (1985) in the sense that it consolidates the budget constraint of 
utility maximizing consumers with that of the government and allows individuals 
to  derive  utility  not  only  from  private  consumption  but  also  from  public 
consumption. 
As  a  modification to Aschauer's  representative  agent  model  with  infinite 
horizon  a finite planning horizon is introduced in order to be able to nest  the 
Ricardian  equivalence  proposition  and  the  conventional,  non-Ricardian 
hypothesis.  The  introduction  of  finitely  lived  consumers  in  the  overlapping 
generations framework means that there is no simple and at the same time very 
realistic  way  to derive an aggregate consumption function.  Since the  economy 
consists  of  consumers  of  different  ages,  the  amounts  and  compositions  of accumulated wealth, time horizons and propensities to consume out of wealth vary 
across different  consumer^.^ 
Generally, the aggregation problem can be handled in two ways which both 
rely  on  a  set  of  restrictive  assumptions  that  are  needed  to  keep  the  models 
mathematically  tractable.  One  way  is  to  assume  that  there  are  only  a  few 
generations alive  in  any  period,  so that  it  is  simple  enough  to  compute the 
consumption  for  each  generation and  then  add them  together. The other way, 
suggested by Blanchard (1985) and followed in this paper, is to assume that all 
consumers  face  the  same  probability of  death  at  each  point  in time.  Despite 
different ages and different levels of wealth, consumers have the same horizon (the 
same expected remaining lifetime) and the  same propensity to consume out of 
wealth.  Due  to  this  assumption,  the  economy  behaves  as  if  it  had  only  one 
representative consumer, which makes aggregation possible despite the infinite 
number of generations. 
Blanchard's approach is flexible in the sense that the probability of death that 
measures the finiteness of life can be interpreted in several ways:  as a horizon 
index  between  zero  and  infinity  (Blanchard  (1985)),  the  disconnectedness of 
current consumers from future generations (Barro (1974)), or as the myopia with 
which consumers foresee future taxes. Modelling households as if they have finite 
horizons is also a substitute for modelling capital market imperfections which may 
lead consumers to behave as if they had short horizons (see Evans (1988, 1993)).6 
Generally, by  letting  the  probability of  death  go  to zero,  one  gets  an  infinite 
horizon  as  a  limiting  case.  In  empirical  work  this  interpretational  flexibility 
constitutes clearly a problem. Another problem related to Blanchard's approach is 
that it does not capture the change in consumer behaviour over life, ie the life- 
cycle aspect of life. In this respect the formulation is closer to that of permanent 
income by Friedman  (1957) than  to life-cycle by  Modigliani  (1966), and suits 
better  to  issues  where  the  finite  horizon  aspect  is  important  (aggregate 
consumption studies) than to issues where differences in propensity to consume 
across consumers is important (cross section st~dies).~ 
The results of the model are based on several restrictive assumptions of which 
the most important are the assumptions of constant real interest rate and quadratic 
utility. 
Modigliani (1966) has pointed out that the relationship among wealth level, wealth composition 
and propensity to consume makes exact or approximate aggregation impossible. 
Blanchard interpreted the death probability as a measure of the consumers' planning horizon. A 
finite horizon in this context means that the expected lifetime is finite and not that consumers are 
myopic. Under Barro's (1974) interpretation, the death probability measures the disconnectedness 
of  current households from future generations. If  current households treat future households as 
continuations of themselves and have altruistic bequest motives they behave as if they had infinite 
horizons (death probability is zero). In this context positive death probability implies that current 
households  feel at least to some extent to be disconnected from future generations (no bequest 
motive). 
If permanent income is taken to be the annuity value of lifetime resources, the two theories are 
very close. Friedman did not, however, commit himself to this interpretation (see eg Deaton 1992). 2.1  Individual consumer8 
Consumers are assumed to adjust their consumption according to their lifetime 
wealth (permanent income) rather than to -their current income. In each period, 
each consumer is assumed to face a known probability of  survival y,9 which is 
assumed to be independent of age. Probability of surviving from period t through 
period t+j is thus yj and the expected life of each consumer, or the horizon index in 
Blanchard's terminology, is ll(1- y). 
Consumers are  assumed  to  have  unrestricted access to  capital markets  at 
which they may accumulate or decumulate assets at the same constant real rate of 
return r as the government sector, but due to the lifetime uncertainty the effective, 
risk-adjusted interest factor for consumers is (l+r)ly. Following Blanchard (1985) 
it is assumed that there is no bequest motives, and that  negative bequests are 
prohibited. All the consumers' wealth (positive or negative) will be returned to the 
riskless life insurance companies contingent on their death.'' 
Each consumer born in period t-k  and still alive in period t is assumed to 
choose  a consumption  strategy that  maximizes expected  life-time  utility as  of 
period t 
where cT,~  denotes the total effective real consumption of a consumer of age k at 
time t, p is the subjective discount factor (1+6)-' with 6 the constant positive rate 
of  subjective  time  preference,  E,  is  the  mathematical  expectation  operator 
conditional on information known to the consumer in period t and u(cT) is a time- 
invariant, one period utility function satisfying u' > 0 and u"  < 0. 
Following Bailey (1971) the total private effective consumption cT  in period t 
is a linear combination" of private consumption c:  and a portion 0 of government 
spending g, 
Throughout the paper, uppercase letters will represent stocks or present discounted values, and 
lowercase letters will represent the corresponding flows. 
y = 1  -p, where p is the death rate in Blanchard's (1985) model. 
lo An equivalent assumption to the riskless insurance companies is that there exist actuarial bonds. 
Lenders lend to intermediaries and  the claims are cancelled by  the death  of  lenders. Similarly, 
borrowers borrow from intermediaries and the claims are cancelled by the death of the borrowers. 
Intermediation is thus riskless. 
" The most  commonly used  specification in  previous  studies has  been  a  linear  function like 
equation (2) (Feldstein (1982), Kormendi (1983), Aschauer  (1985), Seater and Mariano (1985), 
Graham and Himarios (1991) and Graham (1993)). An alternative specification considered by Bean 
(1986), Campbell and Mankiw (1990) and Ni (1995) is the Cobb-Douglas specification. A  negative  value for 812 implies  that  an  increase in  government consumption 
raises the marginal utility of private consumption (ie the two are complements), 
whereas a positive 0 would suggest that an increase in government consumption 
diminishes  the  marginal  utility  of  private  consumption  (ie  the  two  are 
 substitute^).'^ 
The individual consumer of age k is assumed to maximize the objective (1) 
subject to the sequence of one period flow budget constraints 
where 
h,,, is period t real disposable labour income (human wealth) of a consumer of age 
k, defined as y,,, + tr,, - t,, 
14 
y,,  is period t real before-tax labour income of a consumer of age k 
tr,, is period t real government transfers (lump-sum) received by a consumer of 
age k 
t,, is period t real gross tax payments (lump-sum) of a consumer of age k 
a,,,  real  nonlabour  assets  (or  debt,  if  negative)  including  government  bonds 
(nonhuman wealth) of a consumer of age k at the end of period t 
a,-',,-'  real assets accumulated (or debt incurred) in period t- 1 of  a consumer of 
age k- 1 
r is a constant real rate of interest 
l2 A negative 8 would force the marginal utility of government consumption to take negative values 
as well. Christian0 and Eichenbaum (1988) and Barro (1989b) have shown that a function of g, can 
be added to the utility function so that the government consumption's marginal utility becomes 
positive. Equation (1) would be modified to  (yp)i [u(c:~,~+~)+@(~~)]  with a@/ag,  > 0. Since 
consumers  have  no  control  over  g,  the  maximization  problem  can  be  solved  ignoring  the 
government consumption's contribution to utility through the function @. 
l3 This does not refer to the substitutability in the sense of  Hicks-Allen.  Instead, the Edgeworth 
criterion is used according to which private and public consumption are "net rivals" if the marginal 
utility of one decreases as the quantity of the other increases, and "net complements" if the opposite 
holds. Let the utility function be U(cy,g,). The substitutability between cp and g, is reflected by the 
gross second derivative U,,,  If U,,  < 0 (ie an increase in g, reduces the marginal utility of c4, then c: 
and g, are Edgeworth substitutes. If U,,  > 0, they are Edgeworth complements, and if U,, = 0,  they 
are Edgeworth independent - in this case c:  and g, are separable. Under the additivity assumption 
of  private  consumption  and  government  spending  (equation  (2))  and  U(c:  +  Og,)  concave, 
U,,  < (>,=) 0 if and only if 8 > (<,=) 0. A negative 8 corresponds to complementarity and a positive 
8 to  substitutability. According  to  Ni  (1995)  the  empirical  estimates of  the  parameter  8  are 
sensitive to the specification of total effective consumption: when specified as a linear function like 
equation (2), government spending tends to be a substitute for private consumption, whereas Cobb- 
Douglas as well as CES forms tend to imply complementarity. 
l4 Since the human wealth includes social security contributions and excludes payroll taxes, social 
security wealth is treated as part of human wealth in the consumption function. 
13 Gross labour income y,, government transfer payments tr,, taxes t, and government 
consumption g, are assumed to be random variables and to follow given stochastic 
processes  outside  the  control  of  the  consumer. The  term  (l+r)ly  is  the  risk- 
adjusted gross rate of return on nonlabour assets. During period t the consumer 
saves  (borrows if  negative) to buy assets and new  government bonds and 
expects  to  receive  a  stream of  interest  payments  on  the  accumulated  assets. 
Government consumption g, enters the consumer's  one period budget constraint 
(3) multiplied by 8. 
In the case of no binding borrowing constraints the conventional solvency 
condition  is  used to rule out Ponzi-games (see Blanchard and Fischer  (1989)) 
where consumers can borrow indefinitely to finance an infinite consumption and 
ever increasing debt burden in each period by new loans; if the consumer is still 
alive at time t+j, then 
The no-Ponzi-game condition thus requires that the expected rate of  growth of 
assets  must  be  less than the risk-adjusted interest rate  (l+r)ly. Subject to this 
solvency condition the forward substitution in equation (3)  gives the expected 
value of the lifetime budget constraint of a consumer of age k at time t in terms of 
total effective consumption 
where 
Since it is assumed that future disposable labour incomes are not known, human 
capital of a household of age k at time t is the discounted sum of expected future 
disposable labour incomes E,H,,,.  In the same vein, E,G, denotes the discounted sum of  expected future government consumption and EtW,, the present value of 
expected total wealth of a consumer of age k at time t.15 
Equation  (4)  states  that  the  expected  present  value  of  total  effective 
consumption  at  time t equals the expected present  value  of  disposable labour 
income, initial nonlabour assets q-,  and interest earned between period t- 1 and t. 
The important thing here is that the consumer is constrained only by the lifetime 
budget  constraint, so that  consumption can be  shielded from period to  period 
fluctuations in income through borrowing and lending. 
The term  OEtGt appears  in the  definition of  wealth because  according to 
Aschauer (1985) a higher level of  government consumption imposes a negative 
(positive) wealth effect on the consumer if 0 < 1 (> 1). If  0 equals one, an increase 
in  government spending has  one-to-one wealth  effect  and  if  0 equals  zero,  a 
permanent increase in government consumption has no wealth effect. In case that 
0 is negative, an increase in government consumption will produce a wealth loss. 
The  first-order  necessary  conditions  for  the  consumer's  maximization 
problem with respect to total private consumption cT  gives the Euler equations 
The sequence of Euler equations (5) characterize the relation between two adjacent 
periods  along the optimal path  of  consumption: in optimum reallocation of  cT 
between two periods cannot increase utility. 
A closed-form solution for cT  can be obtained in the special case of quadratic 
utility. Following Hall (1978) the one-period utility function is assumed to be of 
the formr6 
l5 This formulation requires that consumer behaviour exhibits certainty equivalence: the individual 
consumer chooses the path of consumption as if her future incomes and government consumption 
were  certain  to  equal  their  means.  Hence,  uncertainty  about  future  disposable  income  or 
government consumption has no impact on private consumption. The certainty equivalence arises 
when  utility function is quadratic. With  linear marginal utility function the marginal  utility  of 
consumption  is  equal  to  the  marginal  utility  of  expected  consumption. In  this  case it is  as if 
expected consumption were known with certainty. Hence, only the expected values count, and not 
the variances. 
l6  Unless the utility function takes a specific form like a quadratic form, the Euler equation does not 
aggregate  across consumers. Hall (1978) has demonstrated that if  one-period utility function is 
assumed to be a local approximation of the consumer's true utility function, different functional 
forms can be locally approximated by a quadratic form (see also Hayashi (1982), pp. 898-899). Its 
simplicity does not,  however, come without serious shortcomings (see Zeldes (1989)). A more 
plausible  utility  function  is  the  constant relative  risk  aversion  (CARA) function. Under  such 
preferences and stochastic future labour income, the solution for consumer's maximization problem 
derived  above is  only  an  approximation. When  future  labour  income  uncertainty is  high,  an 
approximate  consumption  function  would  predict  lower  consumption  than  predicted  by  the 
certainty equivalent solution. where E  is the bliss level of consumption. In this case, the Euler equation can be 
written as 
Note that equation (6) is independent of  the survival probability y  (ie dynamic 
equilibrium condition of the consumer is independent of the survival probability). 
This comes from the fact that the consumer's (of age k) future utility is discounted 
at the rate (yp) whereas future values are discounted at the rate of  yl(l+r). This 
implies  that  the  intertemporal  marginal  rate  of  substitution,  IMRS,  is 
(yl(l+r))l(yP) = (P(l+r))-', which is the intertemporal relative price of period t+l 
consumption relative to that of period t. 
By assuming that r = 6, 8=0 and y=l, one obtains Hall's (1978) well known 
random walk in consumption implied by the permanent income hypothesis, eg the 
Euler equation is Etct+,=c,.  Alternatively, this can be written as c, = c,-, + E,, where 
E, is a rational forecast error, the innovation in permanent income. According to 
this  formulation  the  optimal  forecast for  current consumption  is  the  previous 
period's consumption. 
Using  the Euler equation  (6) to  substitute out c:+~,,+~  from the consumer's 
lifetime budget constraint (4),  allows to solve for the total effective consumption 
of a consumer of age k at time t 
where 
In terms of private consumption cy, equation (7) can be written as 
The term in the brackets in equations (7) and (8) represents total expected wealth 
E,W,,  and  P,  the  constant  marginal  propcnsity  to  consume  out  of  wealth. Specifications (7) and (8) imply that taxes as well as government transfers are age- 
specific while government consumption is not. 
2.2  Aggregate consumption 
Since the  economy consists  of  overlapping  generations, the  derivation  of  the 
aggregate consumption function requires the determination of  the size of  each 
generation and to sum across all generations. The population is normalized such 
that the initial size of each generation is one. As a fraction y of consumers in each 
generation survives each period, there are yk  members of the consumers of age k in 
each period. The size of the population is therefore constant17  and given by 
Aggregating  consumption  over  all  generations  and  dividing  by  the  size  of 
population yields expected per capita aggregate private consumption c: 
Similarly, expected per capita aggregate wealth in period t can be obtained by 
dividing the discounted sum of  expected total wealth of  all consumers from all 
generations by the total population 
where 
" Allowing for nonzero population growth as in  Weil  (1987) would  complicate the exposition 
without adding substantially to the theoretical analysis (see Evans (1993)). Population growth can 
be incorporated in the analysis by assuming a constant exogenous rate of population growth s. In 
this case the interest rate r is replaced by (r-s)/(l+s), the net interest rate, and if (I-y) is replaced 
by (1 -  y+s)l(l+s), the rate at which disconnected households flow into the economy; ie, the "birth 
rate".  Ricardian equivalence holds if all new households are connected to old households; ie, if 
1-y = s. In that case, households act as if  their memberships are growing at the same rate as 
population is growing. If instead households act as if their memberships are growing less rapidly 
than population, then Blanchard's alternative to Ricardian equivalence holds. and 
Aggregate per capita private consumption may now be written as a function of 
expected aggregate per capita wealth 
Equation  (15) contrasted  with  equation  (8)  shows that  marginal  propensity  to 
consume out of  total wealth remains invariant across aggregation. Furthermore, 
instead of the risk-adjusted interest rate on nonlabour assets in equation (8), the 
rate  applicable in equation  (15) is  the risk-free interest rate. The finiteness  of 
individual lives results thus in a higher effective discount rate on human wealth 
than the discount rate for nonlabour assets. Since human wealth is specific to the 
individual,  it disappears from the system when  the individual dies whereas the 
insurance mechanism guarantees that assets or nonlabour wealth is retained within 
the system. Therefore, the two types of wealth are discounted differently implying 
the nonneutrality of government debt and deficits. 
With  a  view  towards  empirical  implementation,  the  nonlabour  assets  are 
eliminated from the consumption function.18 It is shown in the Appendix  1 that 
equation (15) can be rearranged as 
where 
l8 In principle, alternative mathematically equivalent solutions of consumption functions based on 
the Euler equation approach should give the same empirical results. Himarios'  (1995) empirical 
study  shows,  however,  that  this  may  not  be  the  case.  He  uses  as  examples three  alternative 
solutions,  one  in  which  human  wealth  is  eliminated  (based  on  Evans  (1988)),  one  in  which 
nonhuman wealth is eliminated (based on Haque (1988)) and one which incorporates both forms of 
wealth (based on Hayashi (1982)). Despite the fact that all three expressions are mathematically 
equivalent they result in different empirical results. Himarios concludes that the reason for this is 
most likely the misspecification from not controlling the existence of liquidity constraints in the 
estimated  models. When  this source of  misspecification is corrected the different mathematical 
solutions yield the same empirical results. Error terms eHt  = (E,-E,-l)Ht and E,,  = (E,-E,-,)G, reflect the revisions of expecta- 
tions about the sequence of h,:,  and g,,  that consumers make between period t- 1 
and  t.  Hence,  the  change  In  private  consumption  from  t-1  to  t,  that  is 
unpredictable  at  time  t- 1, is  related to  the  new  information about disposable 
labour income and government consumption. New information at t will cause the 
consumer  to  revise  previously  held  expectations  about  current  and  future 
disposable labour income and government consumption, so that the discounted 
present  value  of  these  expectations will  itself  change.  This  is  the  change in 
permanent income that is warranted by news, and it is this that sets the change in 
consumption. 
Equation  (16)  gives  the  expression  for  aggregate  per  capita  private 
consumption  in  terms  of  lagged  private  consumption,  current  and  lagged 
government consumption, lagged government debt, expected per  capita human 
wealth,  expected  aggregate  per  capita  wealth  accruing  from  government 
consumption and revisions in expectations consumers make about human capital 
and government consumption when proceeding from period t- 1 to period t. 
2.3  The government sector 
By  definition  forward looking rational consumers take into account the future 
consequences of current fiscal policy when making their consumption and saving 
decisions. In addition they take into account the benefits to be derived from the 
future government consumption. Accordingly, the private and public sectors can 
be consolidated by the substitution of  the government budget constraint into the 
aggregate per  capita private  consumption function  (16). When  y  equals unity 
consumers  fully  regocnize  the  future  tax  obligations  implicit  in  current  debt 
finance of a given path of future government consumption. In this case consumers 
have infinite horizons and the Ricardian equivalence proposition holds. With y 
smaller than one, consumers behave myopically or have shorter planning horizon 
than the government, which leads to the break down of the Ricardian equivalence. 
In  period  t the government one-period budget constraint in real per capita 
terms is 
where b, denotes one-period real government debt. 
Forward  substitution  for  government debt  in  (17)  gives  the  intertemporal 
constraint for the public sector 
EtTt=EtGt+EtTRt+(l+r)b,l  -1im 
j-m 
where Imposing the solvency constraint ~,lim,.~l+r)-'  b,  = 0 for the government sector 
that  prohibits  the  Ponzi  game  where  government  can  run  primary  deficits 
indefinitely and accumulate an ever increasing public debt by new loans gives19 
The government budget constraint (19) equates the present value of  expected tax 
receipts  to  the  initial  government  debt  and  the  present  value  of  expected 
government consumption  plus transfer payments. This  intertemporal constraint 
states that, for a given path of government consumption, a deficit-financed cut in 
current taxes leads to higher future taxes that have the same expected value as the 
current tax cut. 
Substituting equation (19) into (16) gives 
where EtYt  [=Ez[r)  jy,+)  represents the discounted value of expected future 
1  +r 
labour  incomes  and  u,  represents  transitory  consumption.20 Equation  (20) 
expresses aggregate private consumption per capita as a function of  a constant 
term, expected lifetime labour income, expected government consumption as well 
l9 The government sector solvency constraint to be satisfied, government debt must grow at a rate 
below r (a necessary condition for the Ricardian equivalence to hold,  see Hamilton and Flavin 
(1986)). If the debt grows at the rate r, interest payments for b, are financed by issuing new debt. If 
the debt grows at any rate above r, the limit would be infinite leading to unsustainable situation. In 
theory, government debt can grow at the rate of the real interest rate in a growing economy, but for 
the debt-to-GDP ratio to remain finite in each period, the real growth rate of the economy must be 
less than the real interest rate. 
20 Transitory consumption is defined as zero-mean shocks to the utility function and measurement 
errors  in  consumption. Flavin  (1981, p. 992) justifies  neglecting transitory consumption on  an 
aggregate level. If  individual realizations of transitory consumption are independently distributed 
across the population, aggregate transitory consumption is negligible. as  current  and  lagged  government  consumption,  lagged  private  consumption 
purchases  and  government  debt.  It  nests  both  Ricardian  and  non-Ricardian 
hypotheses as special cases. The key parameters are y  and 8. With y  equal to 
unity,  forward  looking  rational  consumers  have  infinite  horizon  and  consider 
today's  deficit financing  as tomorrow's  tax  liabilities. Hence,  deficits have no 
effect on current consumption. Consumers base their consumption decisions on 
lifetime (permanent) income, which depends on the present value of government 
consumption but not on the timing of tax collections. 
The parameter y less than unity implies that due to shorter planning horizon, 
myopia  or  liquidity  constraints  consumers  will  regard  their  holdings  of 
government bonds as net wealth. When this is the case, a current tax cut financed 
by issuing new government debt will increase expected human wealth and private 
consumption. This positive effect derived from an intertemporal reallocation of 
taxes is due to the different discount rates: if 0 < y < 1, consumers discount taxes 
at  a  rate  yl(l+r)  whereas  the  future  interest  income  on  government  debt  is 
discounted at a rate (l+r)-'. In other words one unit of taxes in period t+j has the 
present value (yl(l+r))J  which is smaller than (l+r)-J,  the present value of one unit 
of interest income on debt. The future tax increase is thus given a smaller weight 
by finite-horizon consumers than the weight attached by them to the current tax 
cut. In the case of extreme myopia (y=O), consumers treat government debt fully 
as a net wealth. 
More specifically, with y equal to unity, 8 equal to zero and 6 equal to r, 
equation  (20)  reduces  to  the  Hall  (1978)  specification  in  which  the  current 
consumption  and  last  period's  consumption  differ  only  by  the  extent  of  the 
forecast error in current disposable income.21  The infinite horizon (y=l) and the 
assumption of no population growth imply that there is no way for individuals to 
evade taxes by dying andor levying taxes on other generations. 
When y < 1 and 8 + 0, expected human wealth, government consumption and 
government debt affect current consumption over and beyond the impact of lagged 
consumption.  If  government  consumption  substitutes  perfectly  private 
consumption  (8=1), one has Feldstein's  (1982) condition for complete ex ante 
crowding out and fiscal policy neutrality. 
3  Empirical implementation 
3.1  Derivation of the reduced form consumption function 
The main problem in estimating intertemporal consumption function with rational 
expectations  like  equation  (20)  is  how  to  handle  unobservable  future  path  of 
labour  income  Y  and  government  consumption  G.  One  solution  is  to  follow 
Hayashi's procedure (1982) and to exploit the stochastic difference equation on 
expected  labour  income  and  government  consumption  to  eliminate  the 
unobservables from the estimation equation. The advantage of this method is that 
21  According to Flavin (1981) consumption would be an exact random walk only if the transitory 
component of income were identically equal to zero. one  needs  not  to  specify  the  stochastic  processes  for  labour  income  and 
government cons~mption.~~  Accordingly, the following difference equations are 
stipulated 
where  e,,  and e,,  are the  expectational revisions  made  by  consumers  as they 
proceed from period t- 1 to period t. Formally, 
These  surprise  terms  are,  by  construction,  orthogonal  to  the  information  set 
available  in  t- 1,  I+,,  and  thus  serially  uncorrelated.  They  may,  however,  be 
correlated with variables dated period t and contemporaneously correlated with 
each other. 
Using equations (21) to form c:  - [(l+r)ly]c:-,  the unobservable variables can 
be removed from equation (20). Rearranging gives the expression for c:  in terms 
of observable variables: 
where 
r(6 -  r) -  Pb=-  c  and  P1=l-  ~(1+6) 
(  1  +r>  (1 +r12 
22 Another approach to model the future path of government consumption followed by  Aschauer 
(1985) is to use an explicit forecast equation in which present and past values of government debt 
and deficit are used to signal changes in government spending. This kind of formulation has the 
advantage that if allows to distinguish between debt as a potential source of  wealth, which is the 
concern of the Ricardian equivalence, and debt's role as a signal of future levels of government 
consumption. 3.2  Econometric issues 
Before the model can be estimated, it is necessary to address several issues of 
specification  that  arise  from the  nature  of  aggregate time  series  data  used  in 
estimations.  The  estimation  of  equation  (22)  involves  a  number  of  problems, 
which  risk  to  result  in  inconsistent  parameter  estimates.  Firstly,  the  time 
aggregation imposed on consumption function by  the use of  annual data in the 
estimations  and  the  inclusion of  consumer  durables in  the  measure of  private 
consumptionz3 introduces  a  first-order  moving  average  term  into  the  lagged 
consumption expenditure (see Working (1960) and Campbell and Mankiw (1990) 
for time aggregation and Mankiw (1982) for durability). To avoid misspecification 
arising from time-averaging and durability requires the use of instruments that are 
lagged more than one period so that there is at least two period time gap between 
the instruments and the variables in equation (22). There may also be white-noise 
errors in the levels of  the consumption and income variables due to 'transitory 
consumption'  or to the measurement errors. White-noise errors in levels become 
first-order moving average errors in the specification and could be correlated with 
once-lagged instruments, but not with twice-lagged instruments. 
Second problem pointed out by Hayashi (1982) is that although E,, e,,  and eGt 
are orthogonal to the information set at time t- 1, I;-,, they might not be orthogonal 
to y,,  g, and b,,  since these variables do not belong to I;-,. To  correct for this 
problem requires also the use of  instrumental variables estimator, where at least 
twice-lagged  variables  are  chosen  as  instruments,  which  by  definition  are 
orthogonal to E,, e,,  and e,,. 
These arguments for twice-lagging the instruments imply that the error term 
in  equation  (22) has  a first-order moving  average structure (MA(1)). If  this  is 
ignored and standard nonlinear least squares and instrumental variables procedures 
are used, the coefficient estimates remain consistent but the standard errors are 
inconsistent.  To  derive  consistent  standard  errors  in  the  presence  of  serial 
correlation  and conditional heteroscedasticity in the error term Hansen's  (1982) 
GMM estimator is used. The reported standard errors are thus heteroscedasticity 
and autocorrelation consistent standard errors  (White (1980)) calculated by  the 
Parzen kernel estimator. 
Since  the  equation  (22)  is  nonlinear  only  in  its  parameters,  it  could  be 
estimated  as  an  unrestricted  linear  model.  One  could  then  test  whether  the 
estimated  composite  coefficients  have  the  probability  limits  implied  by  the 
Ricardian  equivalence.  However,  given  that  the  model  is  overidentified,  the 
23 See Ch. 4 and Appendix 3 for further details on the measurement of the data. underlying parameters cannot be recovered. By using a nonlinear estimator one 
can  get  direct  estimates  of  the  parameters  in  question  that  will  give  a  more 
meaningful measure of  any rejection that  might occur. The model adequacy is 
tested by Hansen's (1982) overidentifying restrictions test (J-test).24 
In order for the GMM estimator to be asymptotically justifiable, all variables 
should be  stationary. Nonstationarity would be  a problem when  estimating in 
levels,25  because it can give rise to a spurious relationship among the levels of the 
variables (see Phillips (1986)). Also the parameter estimates from a regression of 
one such variable on others are inconsistent and may not even be convergent. To 
account for the nonstationarity a possible solution would be to follow Campbell 
and Deaton (1989) and to divide all variables by the lagged level of income, y,-, to 
obtain stationarity or to estimate equation (22) in the first difference form. The 
problem in transforming the equation into difference form is that lagged values of 
AC,  as instruments do not explain a large fraction of  the variance of  act, if  the 
univariate time series process for c, is close to a random walk. 
These  transformations  are,  however,  not  needed,  if  the  variables  are 
cointegrated. Recent results by Sims, Stock and Watson (1990) and West (1988) 
show  that  inference  and  estimation may  proceed  in  the  standard way  and no 
special  steps  to  handle  the  nonstationarity  is  necessary,  if  the  nonstationary 
regressors are cointegrated and the unconditional mean of their first differences is 
non-zero. The underlying theory clearly suggests that there should be a stable long 
run  relationship  among the levels of  variables in equation  (22), and the  set of 
variables used in the empirical estimation should be cointegrated. It is shown in 
the Appendix 2 that the conditions required for estimating in levels are fulfilled for 
equation (22). 
4  Description of the data and estimation results 
In the study of intertemporal consumption behaviour, it is important to distinguish 
between  consumption  and  consumer  expenditure.  At  any  point  in  time  the 
consumption of previously purchased durable goods yield utility without inducing 
any  consumer  spending.  Likewise,  the  utility  derived  from  current  consumer 
expenditure on durable goods is not restricted to the time of purchase, but extends 
to  several periods.  Ideally, consumption of  durable  goods  should therefore be 
measured  in  terms of  service flow  these goods render to the consumer during 
several periods and not in terms of  current expenditures. Despite the efforts made 
24 The test statistic converges in distribution to x:-,  with degrees of freedom equal to the number of 
moment (orthogonality) conditions minus the number of parameters to be estimated. 
25  Flavin (1981, 1985), Hayashi (1982), and others generally specify the permanent income model 
with  variables  in  levels  and  then  remove a deterministic time trend  from the  data to  achieve 
stationarity of the variables. Mankiw and Shapiro (1985), however, show that such detrending can 
lead to spurious excess sensitivity of consumption to income innovations. On the other hand, Stock 
and West (1988) show that the spurious sensitivity is not due to spurious cycles but rather to the 
shift in the asymptotic distribution when a deterministic trend is included. to compute the imputed services from durable goods, no reliable method exists so 
far.26 
Due to the arbitrariness and difficulties involved in the imputation of a service 
flow from the stock of consumer durables, the permanent-income hypothesis and 
Ricardian  equivalence  has  generally  been  tested  by  using  consumption 
expenditures on services and nondurable goods as a relevant measure for private 
con~umption.~~  However, since the measure excluding consumption expenditures 
on  durables  and  semidurables  excludes  also  services  rendered  by  previously 
acquired durable goods, it is no longer strictly valid to estimate the consumption 
function along with the budget constraint. The usual procedure to account for this 
imbalance is to rescale the data by netting durables out of the income measure. 
Rescaling of the data does not, however, solve the basic problem involved in 
this procedure. It requires  that  the components making up real expenditure on 
nondurable goods and services have constant relative prices so that they can be 
treated as a Hicks composite commodity and that the momentary utility function is 
separable between this composite commodity and the service flow from durable 
goods.  There is, however, substantial evidence against this  assumption (see eg 
Eichenbaum  and  Hansen  (1990),  Deaton  (1992)). When  this  is  the  case  the 
practice  of  testing  quadratic  models  of  aggregate  consumption  using  data  on 
nondurables and services only can be called into question. 
Moreover, when the primary interest is in the effects of fiscal policy variables 
on private consumption, the exclusion of consumer durables from the consumption 
measure  could  seriously  bias  the  results  in  favour  of  Ricardian  equivalence 
hypothesis, since purchases of  durables are often considered more  sensitive to 
income  or  wealth  changes  than  are  nondurables.  Although  the  total  private 
consumption  expenditure  is  not  in  line  with  the  underlying  model  of  utility 
maximi~ation,~~  it is considered to be a better measure for private consumption 
than those excluding durable goods altogether or those using computed values of 
the service 
26  A  number  of  studies  have  used  the  consumption data  based  on  the  computation  method 
developed by  Christensen and Jorgenson (1973) for the US data (eg Hayashi (1982), Kormendi 
(1983), Graham and Himarios (1991)). For a discussion of  a potential problem with Christensen 
and Jorgenson's imputed service flow, see Cushing (1992). 
'' See eg Aschauer (1985), Evans (1988), Evans and Hasan (1994), Graham and Himarios (1996), 
Haug (1990), Himarios (1995). 
Since an intertemporally separate utility function means that the marginal rate of  substitution 
between any two periods is independent of the level of consumption in any other period, it does not 
allow for goods whose effects last over time. It is not, however, clear on theoretical grounds that the 
separability assumption is seriously misleading for an aggregate of commodities (real consumption) 
with preferences defined over the quarterly or annual frequencies that are usual in empirical work 
(see Deaton (1992)). 
'' Total  private  final  consumption  expenditure  is  used  by  Haque  (1988)  and  Evans  (1993). 
Campbell and  Mankiw  (1990)  used  both  total consumption expenditures  and  expenditures on 
nondurables and services. No inferences were affected by the choice of the consumption measure. 
In Graham and Himarios (1991), however, the choice of  the consumption measure proved to be 
critical to the rejection or nonrejection of  some hypotheses tested. On the importance of the choice 
of consumption measure for Kormendi's (1983) results, see Graham (1992). When  measuring  the  government  consumption  the  distinction  between 
government  spending on goods and services that provides utility to the private 
consumers in  the  current period  and  that yielding  utility in  future periods via 
government investment would potentially be important (see Kormendi (1983) on 
that  and  further  aspects).  However,  the  problems  arising  from  the  correct 
measurement of  durability are the same here as in private consumption. Another 
problem  arises  from  the  heterogeneity  of  government  consumption  -  some 
components can  be  considered  as  close  substitutes, some  as  complements  to 
private consumption, for some items neither substitutability nor complementarity 
may exist. A rough way to correct the measure of government consumption due to 
heterogeneity  of  its  components  is  to  exclude  national  defence  expenditures 
(Kormendi (1983), Evans and Karras (1996)). This is not, however, possible in the 
present study due to the lack of data. Consequently, the conventional practice to 
use  total  government expenditure  without  differentiating between  consumption 
and nonconsumption measures or durability is followed here. This might bias the 
coefficient on government consumption downward. 
No attempt is made to distinguish temporary changes in fiscal policy variables 
from permanent changes. In principle this could be an important issue, since under 
rational expectations only permanent changes in fiscal policy variables can affect 
consumption due to changes in permanent income. Changes that are known to be 
transitory cannot influence private consumption. In  practice, the classification of 
changes in fiscal variables as unambiguously temporary or permanent is virtually 
impossible. 
4.1  Data 
To estimate the model, annual time series data for Finland from  1960 to  1995 
obtained from the OECD National Accounts and the Bank of Finland data bank 
are  used.  Given  that  some  observations  are  lost  due  to  the  use  of  lagged 
instruments the actual estimation period starts from 1964. Detailed description of 
the data is given in the Appendix 3. 
Private consumption c, is measured by per capita total private consumption 
expenditures at 1990 prices, before-tax labour income y, is measured by per capita 
wages  and  salaries including  employers'  contributions  for  social  security  and 
private  pension,  operating  surplus  of  private  unincorporated  enterprises  and 
withdrawals from private quasi-corporate enterprises. Taxes t, are measured by per 
capita household income taxes and other direct taxes. Government consumption g, 
is measured by general government final consumption expenditures per capita at 
1990 prices. Government debt b, is measured by per capita general government 
debt in book value. 
In  addition a dummy variable D9 1-93 is included in the regressions on the 
ground that during these years the Finnish economy was hit by an unexceptionally 
deep  recession  and  severe  banking  crisis.30 The  inclusion  of  this  dummy  is 
supported by prior examination of the data and it leads also to a more satisfactory 
30 On the effects of  banking crisis on private consumption and saving in Finland, see Brunila and 
Takala (1993). performance of the estimated model. The use of a dummy in this way is of course 
open to the objection of data mining. 
The instrument set consists of  a constant, the second through fourth lag of 
total private consumption, the second and third lag of  before-tax labour income, 
government  debt,  household  income  taxes,  the  second  lag  of  government 
consumption, the  first  and  second  lag  of  the  terms  of  trade  and  the  dummy 
variable. All instruments except the terms of trade and the dummy are measured in 
per capita terms. The same set of instruments were used in all  estimation^.^' 
The real interest rate was fixed to 3 % p.a. in the estimations. The average real 
rate of  return measured by the  10 year interest rate on government bonds was 
2.7 % over the sample period.32  All data not already valued at  1990 prices are 
deflated  by  the  price  deflator  implied  by  the  ratio  of  nominal  total  private 
consumption expenditures to those valued at 1990 prices. 
4.2  Estimation results 
Deviations from Ricardian neutrality have generally been explained by different 
planning  horizons  of  the  government  and private  sector. As  suggested by  the 
theoretical framework the effects of  government financing decisions on private 
consumption depend crucially on the estimated parameter value of  y, eg on the 
length of average horizon for private consumption and saving decisions, ll(1- y). 
Estimated parameter values for  y  less  than  unity  results in  a shorter planning 
horizon  for  the  private  sector  and  hence,  in  fiscal  policy  nonneutrality.  The 
unrestricted version of the consumption equation is estimated first and then theory- 
generated restrictions on y and 8 are tested using the Wald test.33 
Table 1 presents the estimates of  P, y  and 8 with their autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors over the 1964- 1995 sample period. A 
constant term is always included as both an instrument and a regressor but is not 
reported  in  the  tables.  The  J-statistic  is  a  x2  test  for  the  validity  of  the 
overidentification restrictions and its significance level is shown in parentheses 
underneath. 
31 Some results are to some extent sensitive to the number of lags included. In general, the higher 
the number of lags, the more efficient the estimates. When the equations were estimated with non 
linear least squares, the conclusions remained unaffected. 
32 The variability of the real interest rate has, however, been quite substantial during the sample 
period. It should also be noted that the real interest rate was very low and even negative in 1971- 
1982. 
33 The hypotheses to be tested are written as h(b)=O, where b is the vector of parameters of the 
unconstrained model and h(b) is a set of m nonlinear constraints on those parameters. Given a set of 
estimates b and the associated covariance estimate V(b), the constraints h(b) and their covariance 
matrix  (all evaluated at the estimated b vector) is computed as:V(h(b)) = (dNab)' V(b) (dwdb). 
From h(b) and its variance a test statistic is formed T = h(b) V(h(b))-'  (h(b))'. This test statistic is 
distributed asymptotically as a  x2  variable with  degrees of  freedom equal to m under the null 
hypothesis (when the constraints hold). Table 1.  GMM estimation of equation (22), 1963- 1995 with 
constant real interest rate of 3 per cent 
Unrestricted  Restrictions 
Wald-  0.282  2.598  6.489  3.342  9.726  32.916 
test (x2)  0.595  (0.107)  0.011  (0.188)  0.008  (0.000) 
Notes: Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelatiun-consistent  standard errors are in parentheses. The J- 
test is a test of the validity of overidentifying restrictions with its significance level in parentheses. 
The Wald-test is for the validity of the imposed restriction with its significance level in parentheses. 
The instruments for the unrestricted and restricted specifications include the constant, the second 
through the fourth lag of private consumption, the second and third lag of before-tax labour income, 
government debt, household income taxes, the second lag of government consumption, the first and 
second lag of the terms of trade and the dummy variable. 
Overall results suggest that all parameter estimates are statistically significant at 
least  at 5 per  cent level and have the expected sign. Moreover, the parameter 
estimates and their statistical significance remain virtually unchanged in various 
specifications  except those of  P which prove to be  somewhat sensitive to  the 
various restrictions imposed on the value of 0. 
As  discussed  in  section 3 and  above, Ricardian  equivalence holds  when 
consumers  and  the government have the  same planning horizon, eg  y=l. The 
unrestricted  estimate  of  y  turns  out  to  be  around  unity  and  is  statistically 
significant at 1 per cent significance level. This result gives a strong support for 
the Ricardian neutrality hypothesis and infinite planning horizon. In other words, 
the wealth effect of government debt financing is zero. This implies that during the sample period  one cannot reject the hypothesis that  consumers take  fully into 
account the future tax implications of  the government debt accumulation and do 
not increase their consumption with the government deficit financing. 
The estimate of  P, that measures the marginal propensity to consume out of 
total  expected wealth,  is,  however,  much  too high  given the  infinite planning 
horizon.34  With constant 3 per cent real rate of return and estimated P about .64, 
the  imputed  value  of  subjective  time  preference  6  becomes  negative.  This 
anomalious  result  is  related  to  the  empirical  puzzle  where  high  growth  of 
aggregate consumption  is observed in  the  presence  of  a low  or  negative  real 
interest rate (Deaton (1986)), although under any certainty equivalence model of 
consumption with time separable utility, the growth rate of consumption must be 
negative, if the interest rate is less than the rate of time preference. A negative time 
preference is therefore required in order to explain positive expected growth rates 
of individual consumption with low or negative real risk-free interest rates (Zeldes 
(1989)).35  In addition, the upward bias of P may at least partly reflect the existence 
of liquidity (or borrowing)  constraint^.^^ 
In  line  with  earlier  studies  on  the  US  data  (Kormendi  (1983), Aschauer 
(1985)) the unconstrained estimate for the substitutability parameter 0 turns out to 
be  positive  implying  that  consumers  perceive  government  consumption  as  a 
substitute for private consumption. The estimate is statistically significant at 5 per 
cent level. Recent  studies (Karras (1994), Evans  and Karras (1996)) using  the 
same  kind  of  formulation  for  total  consumption  as  here  (equation  (2))  but 
otherwise different specifications have, however, found significant negative values 
for 0 in Finland. With y equal to unity the wealth effect produced by government 
consumption is, however, zero and independent of the value of 0. 
To further test the theory-generated hypotheses, the model is estimated under 
various restrictions (Table 1). Under the restriction y=l the estimated value of  P 
and its statistical significance increase slightly while the estimated value of 0 and 
its  standard  error  decrease. Finally,  and  more  importantly, the  restriction  y =  1 
cannot be rejected by the Wald test. 
The restiction 0=1 conforms to Feldstein's complete ex ante crowding out of 
private  consumption  -hypothesis, which requires  8 to be positive  and equal to 
unity. Under this restriction all coefficient estimates except P maintain thc sarnc or 
nearly the same values and become statistically more significant. According to the 
Wald test statistics the restriction 0=1 cannot be rejected at the conventional levels 
of  significance.  The  alternative  restricton  0=0,  reflecting  the  neutrality  of 
government  and  private  consumption,  is  strongly  rejected  by  the  Wald-test. 
Moreover,  under  this  restriction the estimate of  p becomes  as high  as  1.7. A 
potential explanation for the substantial upward bias in the estimated value of P is 
34 Himarios (1995) obtained the estimated value of  P that is in line with the values reported here 
when he used a consumption function that is based on mathematically equivalent solution. 
35 There is a close analogy to Weil's (1989) risk-free interest rate puzzle. 
36 Under potentially binding liquidity constraints, the underlying Euler equation does not hold since 
some consumers who would like to borrow at the given interest rate but are prevented from doing 
so consume relatively less in  period t and relatively more in period t+l than in the absence of 
liquidity constraints. that the effect of  government consumption is captured indirectly through other 
explanatory variables. 
The joint restiction, y=l and 8=1, cannot be rejected by the Wald test. Again, 
the upward bias in the estimate of  P increases to some extent. For the sake of 
completeness  also the restriction  y=l and  8=0 is jointly  tested.  The result is 
qualitatively the  same as  under the restriction 8=0 and the  same reasoning as 
above applies also here. 
Finally, the joint  restriction, Po = r(6-r)C/(l+r)  and P, = 1- y(1+6)l(l+r)2 is 
imposed.  The  restricted  parameter  estimates  of  y  and  8 and  their  statistical 
significance remain unchanged. The joint restriction is, however, strongly rejected 
by  the Wald-test. Specifically, there appears to be a significant deviation in the 
unrestricted value of p and the one computed from the restricted parameter values 
of  y and 6. The estimation was also run with 6 restricted to positive values and 
alternatively equal to the real interest rate. The results are, however, not reported 
here due to non-convergence and singularity. 
As  for  the  results  regarding  the  dummy  variable  D91-93,  one  can 
immediately  see  that  it  is  statistically  significant in  all  specifications  and  of 
magnitude -4.14- -  6.50. The negative coefficient can be interpreted to result from 
a  limited  access  to  financing  due  to  banking  crisis  and  hence,  reduced 
consumption possibilities  out of  permanent income. In  general, the result is in 
conformity with the structural break that occured during the recession years. 
4.3  The robustness of the results 
The robustness of the results is investigated with respect to different values for real 
rate of interest and different estimation periods. The estimated values of P, y and 8 
and their standard errors for different values of r are reported in Table 2. Setting r 
at 1 per cent increases slightly the upward bias in the estimate of P while the value 
of y decreases to -95.  With 5 per cent real interest rate  the estimated value for P 
decreases and that of y increases. Their standard errors also decrease. The estimate 
of 8 and the absolute value of the coefficient of the dummy variable decrease with 
the increase in the real interest rate.37 
37 The estimate of  6 was found to be  sensitive to the real rate of return in a recent study by Ni 
(1995). 
3  0 Table 2.  GMM estimation of equation (22), 1963- 1995 with 
constant real interest rate of 1 per cent and 5 per cent 
Notes: See notes to Table 1. 
Table 3 shows the results for two sample periods 1964- 1987 and 1970- 1995. As 
seen from the Table the results are particularly sensitive to the estimation period. 
For the first subsample the estimate of  P increases considerably, which may be 
taken as an indication of the existence of liquidity constraints. 
During the  sample period  1964- 1987 the  estimate of  y  decreases to  .93 
implying the rejection of Ricardian equality. The estimated value of y during this 
subperiod may be interpreted to conform to a planning horizon of  14 years, in 
which case consumers do not expect to bear the whole tax burden associated with 
current  debt  financing. Alternatively, it  can  be  interpreted as  an  indication  of 
myopic  behaviour  with  respect  to  government  financing  decisions,  whereby 
consumers treat at least part of  the government debt as net wealth and increase 
their consumption accordingly, or as the existence of liquidity constraints. 
As expected, the value of P decreases significantly and y increases during the 
subperiod starting from 1970 and ending in 1995. Both results are consistent with 
the proposition that financial market liberalization that took place during the 1980s 
has resulted in increasing possibilities for intertemporal consumption smoothing. 
The estimate of 8 decreases when moving from the earlier estimation period to the 
more recent one (ie the degree of substitutability falls). Table 3.  GMM estimation of equation (22) for the subsamples 
1964- 1987 and 1970- 1995 with constant real interest 
rate of 3 per cent 
1964- 1987  1970- 1995 
sample  sample 
I3  1.044  .378 
(.121)  (.098) 
Notes: See notes to Table 1. 
The sensitivity of parameter estimates to the estimation period is hardly a surprise 
for several reasons. As already noted, the first half  of  the estimation period is 
characterized by more extensive financial market regulations and hence, possibly 
more binding liquidity constraints, which of course make the underlying working 
assumption  of  perfect  capital  markets  less  plausible.  The  latter  half  of  the 
estimation period and especially the last ten years are, however, characterized by 
increasingly deregulated and more  sophisticated capital markets with generally 
better  access  to  various  forms  of  financing.  The  estimated  changes  in  the 
parameters over this period are consistent with this interpretation. 
Another and a more crucial factor contributing to the parameter instability 
might be the changes in fiscal policy regime itself. According to Lucas'  (1976) 
well-known critique, consumers, if they are rational will change their expectations 
and behaviour when government changes its policy. Therefore, there is no reason 
to expect a stable relationship between consumption and other relevant economic 
variables  in econometric estimations incorporating  shifts in policy regimes. In 
other words,  when  policy changes, the relationship  between expectations, past 
information  and  behaviour  may  change  and  as  a  consequence,  also  the 
relationships in an econometric model may change. An important implication of 
rational expectations analysis is then, that the effect of a particular policy depends 
critically on what economic agents expect this policy to be. When this is the case, 
there is much less certainty about the effects of any particular policy change. 
Concluding remarks 
In general, the results seem to give support to Ricardian equivalence hypothesis 
suggesting that it provides a reasonable approximation to reality and in particular 
during the latter part of it. One should, however, be cautious and not to interpret 
the results too literally, since the estimated high propensity to consume out of total expected wealth is not entirely compatible with an infinite planning horizon but in 
fact, itself suggests a rather short one. It may also reflect the effects of  liquidity 
constraints which, therefore, should be taken explicitly into account in empirical 
analyses. 
During  the  estimation  period  government  consumption  seems  to  be  a 
substitute for private consumption. Moreover, the tests cannot reject Feldstein's 
hypothesis of complete ex ante crowding out of private consumption in which case 
government consumption substitutes private consumption one-to-one. 
From the point of view of the economy and economic policy the non-rejection 
of  Ricardian  equivalence  hypothesis  would  have  several  implications.  First, 
government  deficit  financing  would  not  result  in  an  increase  in  private 
consumption, but rather a one-to-one increase in private saving. When this is the 
case the ability of fiscal policy to stabilize cyclical changes would be quite limited. 
Second, government financing decisions would  not  affect the economic policy 
mix. Since government deficit financing would be fully backed by  taxation, its 
influence on monetary policy credibility would be nil. When this is the case the 
risk  of  monetization  and  higher  inflation  would  be  nonexistent.  All  this  is, 
however, contrary to the recent experiences shared by several countries with high 
government debt. 
An  important  aspect  to  be  taken  into  account  when  considering  the 
applicability of the results in current situation in Finland is the fact that a fiscal 
policy change in any year may cause consumers to revise their expectations about 
future fiscal policy and thus induce adjustments in their behaviour not accounted 
for in the empirical estimations. Since the fiscal regime  (policy objectives and 
instruments) in Finland has undergone a major shift during the last few years, the 
relationship  between  fiscal  variables  and  private  consumption  might  have 
undergone a change, too. 
Since the outcome of  current fiscal policy actions depend on the way they 
affect consumers' expectations, it is crucial to understand fiscal signals embodied 
in  the  current  policy  and  the  mechanisms  by  which  consumers  revise  their 
expectations concerning the future policy regime. To account for this is a tricky 
problem  since  the  fiscal  signals  conveyed  by  certain  policy  actions  and  the 
resulting change in private consumption are hard to disentangle, since the changes 
in expectations as well as in behaviour depend on the whole history of previous 
fiscal regimes, the overall macroeconomic situation, as well as on public debate on 
these issues. Moreover, if the sustainability of fiscal policy affects the consumers' 
perception  of  the  future  fiscal  regime,  the  relationship  between  private 
consumption and fiscal variables is likely to involve breaks andlor non-linearities 
over time. It might therefore be impossible to predict with accuracy how private 
consumption will respond to the fiscal change in a particular year on the basis of 
historical experience. 
The  variable  response  of  consumption  to  fiscal  signals  implies  that 
econometric analysis cannot produce results that are valid and readily applicable to 
a  particular  situation  but  only  the  average effects  on  private  consumption  of 
changes in  government  consumption, taxes, transfers  and  debt.  Although  such 
estimates do not provide enough information to guide short-run macroeconomic 
policy, they are in principle sufficient to test the hypotheses concerning the degree 
of fiscal policy neutrality. References 
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Aggregating the individual flow budget constraint (3) over all generations gives 
the aggregate per capita flow budget constraint in terms of private consumption 
From equation (1  1) human wealth in period t can be expressed as 
Substituting the consumption function (15) and equation (A2) into (Al) gives 
Lagging (A3) by one period and multiplying both sides by (l+r) yields 
After rearranging and manipulating equation (A4) the total expected wealth can be 
expressed as follows 
Equation (A5) can be rewritten as 
where 
'Ht=(Et-Et-l)Ht 
and reflect  the  revisions  of  expectations  about  hWj  and  gWj  that  consumers  make 
between period t- 1 and t. 
Equation (15) in the text implies that 
Lagging (A7) and rearranging yields 
Substituting (A8) into (A6) yields 
where 
Substituting (A9) into (A7) gives the expression for aggregate per capita private 
consumption. Appendix 2 
The time series properties of the data 
Based on the theory of cointegrated processes, recent research on consumption has 
been  conducted in level form.38  Augmented Dickey-Fuller (1979) tests for unit 
roots  as  well  as  Johansen's  maximum  likelihood  tests  for  cointegration  were 
performed to check whether estimation of equation (22) in levels is appropriate. 
Table A1 presents the results of  augmented Dickey-Fuller tests of  the null 
hypothesis that each series has one unit root and of the null that its first difference 
has one unit root. The unit root test for each series x, is based on the following 
augmented Dickey-Fuller equation: 
where AX, is the variable in question,  A  is the first difference operator, t is a time 
trend, and u, is a stationary error term. Equation (Al), allows for the possibility 
that the series has a time trend, while the lagged first-difference term allow for 
autocorrelation correction. The null-hypothesis of  a unit root is rejected if  P is 
significantly negative. 
The test statistic used for testing non-stationarity is the MacKinnon surface 
response  stat is ti^.^'  Unlike  the  Dickey-Fuller  and  other  test  statistics,  the 
MacKinnon  statistic  is  conditional  upon  the  number  of  observations  and  the 
presence or absence of a time trend as well as the number of variables used in the 
regression. The null hypothesis is that the time series is non-stationary. Rejection 
of the null requires that the regression estimate of the test statistic is greater in 
absolute value than the critical value of the MacKinnon statistic. 
38  See  eg Evans  (1988), Leiderman  and  Razin  (1988),  Graham  and  Himarios  (1991,  1996), 
Himarios (1995). 
39  See MacKinnon (1991). The critical values  are calculated as (P+1iT+6/T2), where P  is the 
estimate of the asymptotic critical value for a test of size p, and 1  and 6 are estimates of the slope of 
the response function conditional upon the sample size T.  MacKinnon provides estimates of  the 
critical values for different significance levels and for various variable combinations, as well as for 
the case where a constant and a time trend are included in the estimation equation. Table A 1.  Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests, sample 1960- 1995 
Variable  Levels  First differences 
ADF (1)  ADF(1) 
1962- 1995  1963- 1995 
Notes: ADF(1) is the ADF statistic of order 1; the critical values of the 
ADF statistics are from MacKinnon (1991); the 0.05 critical value for 
the  sample 1962- 1995 is  -3.547 and  -2.953  for the  sample  1963- 
1995. The  0.01 critical  values  are  -4.251  and  -3.642  respectively. 
Including additional lags did not affect the results. 
The test results indicate that the null hypothesis that each series in levels has one 
unit root cannot be rejected at the 0.05 level for four series, g,, b,, and t,. On the 
basis of the test series tt, is stationary while c, and y, appear to be trend-stationary 
in levels. The null hypothesis that each first-differenced series has one unit root 
can be rejected for all but one series at the 0.05 level. The results suggest b, to be 
integrated of order two. This is, however, clearly an implausible result suggesting 
that  the  real  per  capita  government  debt  would  be  in  an  explosive  path  and 
consequently, leading to unsustainable government debt position in the long term. 
The government debt in Finland has grown very rapidly in the early 1990s due the 
severe recession.  The growth rate  of  the  debt  has  started to  slow  down  only 
recently due to economic recovery and strong actions taken by the government to 
consolidate public finances. The combined effect of  these events and decisions 
seems to have been that the debt series has undergone structural breaks which may 
cause the standard unit root test - which do not allow for the possibility of one or 
more structural breaks under the null and alternative hypotheses - to have a low 
power  (see Perron (1989)). Hence, the evidence regarding the magnitude of  the 
root  in  the  debt  series  is  treated  as  inconclusive.  Moreover,  these  same 
qualifications  apply  also  to  the  private  consumption  and  income  series  that 
experienced considerable breaks in  199  1 and  1994, that may cause the series to 
appear  as  trend  stationary. When  the  years  1991- 1995 are excluded  from the 
sample,  the  unit  root  hypothesis cannot  be  rejected  for  both  series  in  levels. 
Further analyses are conducted assuming that b,, c, and y, are 1(1) variables. 
The results for cointegration are given in Table A2 for the 1(1) variables and 
instruments used in the estimation equation (22). The cointegration estimation is 
based on the Johansen's  (1988) maximum likelihood estimation procedure with 
two lags in the VAR, which produces white noise residuals. Table A2.  Johansen's maximum likelihood tests for cointegration, 
1962- 1995 
Eigenvalue  Null hypothesis  Trace  0.05 critical 
[c,y,g,b,tl  value 
Notes: All equations are estimated assuming the data do not contain a 
deterministic  trend.  Lag  length  of  two  was  used  to  remove 
autocorrelation in the residuals. Critical values for the trace tests are 
obtained from Johansen (1988). 
According to the trace test (Table A2) the hypothesis of cointegration cannot be 
rejected at the conventional 5 % significance level. The fact that the cointegration 
rank is as high as as five, may reflect the possible I(2)ness of the government debt 
series b, (see also ADF-test in Table Al) 
Because  of  the  upward  trend  in  c,,  y,,,  g,  and  b,  the  condition  that  the 
unconditional mean of their first-differences is non-zero is also fulfilled. Appendix 3 
Data 
All variables except terms of  trade are in per  capita terms and deflated by the 
implicit  price  deflator. The data  are from  OECD National  Accounts from the 
period 1960- 1995, if not otherwise indicated. 
Private consumption c,: private final consumption expenditure at 1990 prices. 
Pre-tax labour income y,:  the sum of  household  sector wages, salaries and 
employers'  social  security  contributions,  operating  surplus  of  private 
unincorporated businesses and withdrawals from quasi-corporate enterprises. 
Disposable labour income y,,:  the sum of pre-tax labour income and transfer 
payments, net taxes. 
Government  consumption  g,:  general  government  final  consumption 
expenditure at 1990 prices. 
Taxes  t,:  the  sum  of  household  income  taxes  and  other  direct  taxes, 
employees' social security contributions and fees, fines and penalties. 
Government debt b,: data are end-of-year observations of outstanding central 
government debt at book value (source: Bank of Finland). 
Terms-of-trade tt,: export price index divided by import price index (source: 
Bank of Finland). 
Price deflator: the ratio of final private consumption expenditures at current 
prices to the value of these expenditures at 1990 prices. 
Dummy variable D91-93:  the dummy variable D91-93  is 0 in  1964- 1990 
and 1994- 1995 and 1 in 1991- 1993. 
Population: total population in Finland. 